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A model of the planning, programming, and budgeting
problem is formulated. The variables of the model are
resources, elements, characteristics, benefits (measures of
effectiveness), and costs. The nature of the PPB problem
requires that the model incorporate multiple measures of
benefit and cost. To characterize efficient choices in the
PPB context decision rules which are necessary and suffi-
cient for efficiency are derived. Discounting of benefits
over time is discussed. Sensitivity analysis of the model
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The planning, programming, and budgeting problem for a
governmental agency involves choice among alternatives in
the face of scarce resources. It can therefore be examined
using the principles of economics, since that subject
is fundamentally concerned with the problem of choice in
allocating scarce resources. In this paper a mathematical
model of the PPB problem is presented. The model is simi-
lar in structure to several economic models, particularly
certain models of consumer choice. Like those models in
economics, the purpose of this model at its present stage
of development is not to reproduce the real world nor give
numerical answers to a decision-maker. Rather the purpose
of this model is to develop a conceptual framework for the
PPB problem, using mathematics to ensure a logical develop-
ment.
The purpose of a PPB system is to decide how to
allocate the scarce resources of the Department of Defense.
Different allocations of resources are referred to as
"alternatives" in this paper; alternatives can be viewed
more generally as different ways of structuring the
Department of Defense forces.
The PPB process may be viewed conceptually as an
iterative process, similar to the Walrasian tatonnement

sometimes used in economics to explain how a market works.
In tatonnement an auctioneer sends out prospective prices
to producers and consumers, which he adjusts until supply-
equals demand. In a PPB system the central planners
correspond to the auctioneer, the agents to the producers,
the decision-maker to the consumers, and the prospective
indices to prices. The agents are commanders of areas of
the Department of Defense, such as ASW or armor. The
decision-maker is usually the Secretary of Defense. The
central planners send prospective indices, such as manpower
limits, major mission budgets, and illustrative forces to
the agents. The agents know the technological possibili-
ties within their areas and return to the central planners
estimates of the national defense force levels and
structure which they can supply at the given indices. The
central planners, reflecting the preferences of the
Secretary of Defense, adjust the prospective indices in a
way that they believe will give preferred national defense.
Conceptually the process continues until the Secretary of
Defense is satisfied (supply equals demand in terms of the
economic analogy) . The final plan for national defense is
"the plan." It is the purpose of this paper to study "the
Malinvaud, Edmond, and Bacharach, M. 0. L. , eds.,
"Decentralized Procedures For Planning" by Edmond Malinvaud,
Activity Analysis in the Theory of Growth and Planning;
Proceedings of a Conference held by the International




plan." "The plan" is studied without regard for the process
by which it is computed in the real world.
In this paper the PPB problem is modeled so that the
solution, "the plan," can be studied. The concept of effi-
ciency as it applies to the model is discussed in the
Efficiency section. The general structure of the model and
the nature of the variables are presented in the section
entitled Structure of the Model. Activity analysis and the
mathematical structure of the submodels are explained in
the following two sections. The efficiency problem is then
formulated and decision rules which characterize efficient
choice are derived. In the last three sections of the
paper discounting of benefits over time is treated, sensi-
tivity analysis of the model is performed, and decentrali-




Any number of criteria can be used in choosing among
alternatives. In this model, as in many economic models,
alternatives will be judged using the criterion of effi-
ciency. This is the same notion of efficiency which is
part of the theory of production: production of goods is
efficient if and only if no more of any good can be
produced without decreasing the production of some other
good.
The PPB problem can be studied in terms of benefits
and costs. This approach assumes that the decision-maker's
preferences about alternatives apply to a cost-benefit
space. Figure 1 is a common graphical representation of
the problem of choice when a single benefit and single cost
are involved. The frontier and the area under it represent
the set of cost-benefit combinations given by alternatives








to real world production capability. Assume that the
dec is ion-maker is not satiable with cost or benefit; that
is, he always prefers less cost and more benefit. Then
some alternatives dominate others by giving greater benefit
at the same cost or the same benefit at less cost. Only
alternatives on the frontier are undominated. These
alternatives are efficient. An alternative on the frontier
is efficient because no other feasible alternative can
increase benefit without increasing cost or decrease cost
without decreasing benefit.
A cost-benefit approach is used in this model, but the
nature of the PPB problem does not generally permit the use
of a single measure of benefit, nor even of a single
measure of cost. In this paper the benefits are measures
of effectiveness. It should be clear that the effective-
ness of today's weapons can be measured in many different
ways. In fact, the art of choosing measures of effective-
ness has grown as systems analysis and operations research
in the Department of Defense has expanded. Cost may also
be measured in different ways. For example, both present
discounted cost and total outlay may be pertinent to PPB
decision-making in the Department of Defense. For these
reasons multiple measures of effectiveness and cost are
used in this model.
This does not mean that the results of Figure 1 for
the single benefit-single cost case do not apply in this
model. The representation of this model must, however, be
13

of higher dimensionality. Instead of two dimensions for
one benefit and one cost, L + M dimensions are required to
represent L benefits and M measures of cost. There
still exists an efficiency frontier, or hypersur face, in
L + M dimensions. Of course, the higher dimensional
representation cannot be visualized geometrically. Hitch
and McKean graphically construct in two dimensions the
2
efficiency frontier for the two benefit-single cost case.
However, they must assume that the cost is constrained by
a budget in order to limit the construction to two dimen-
sions.
The cost-benefit nature of this model has still more
dimensions than required by the multiple benefits and
costs. An essential feature of decision-making in the PPB
context is time. The planning horizon is the time period
over which plans are formulated. Therefore, the planning
horizon is divided into T time periods which appear
explicitly in the model. The time period numbers, 1, ...,
T, act as a discrete measure of time. Since benefits
exist in each time period the dimensionality of the cost-
benefit structure is T • L + M. In the higher dimensional
hypersur face a frontier representing efficient alternatives,
efficient over time as well as within time periods, still
exists. The efficient frontier represents the set from
2Hitch, Charles J. , and McKean, Roland N. , The
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, pp. 379-382,
Harvard University Press, 1963.
14

which "the plan" is chosen in the model. The choice of
"the plan" for the planning period is made at the beginning
of the planning period. The preferences of the decision-
maker are the basis of the choice. So that all possible
preferences are considered the efficient frontier is
studied in this model.
15

III. STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
The PPB problem could be modeled in many ways. As in
economics, the phenomenon under study can be modeled in
different ways, depending upon what aspects of the pheno-
menon are of interest. Conceptually models in economics
can be as general or total as desired, but usually the more
general an economic model is, the fewer theorems and con-
clusions it yields.
One way to model a PPB system is to break down the
process by which the model's benefits and costs are genera-
ted in a time period. The process can be described in
terms of basic resources, elements, and system characteris-
tics. In a time period basic resources (e.g. man hours,
raw materials) are used in the production of elements
(e.g. rifles, trained servicemen), elements are combined
into systems which have characteristics (e.g. a platoon's
firepower, its water requirements), and system character-
istics are transformed into measures of effectiveness or
benefits (e.g. kill probability against a bunker). Costs are
estimated by the resources used, elements produced, and
characteristics existing in all time periods. Costs are an
increasing function of these variables. To summarize: in
this model of the PPB problem the variables are resources,
elements, characteristics, benefits, and costs. The
variables have been chosen so that an understanding of
16

their relationships to each other within the model will
give some understanding of "the plan." They are variables
with which it is believed a decision-maker is logically
concerned.
Note that the variables in the model are not structured
exactly as the program elements and programs of the PPB
3
system used by the Department of Defense. Programs are
sets of effectiveness types. They are essentially classi-
fication devices, allowing costs to be linked with program
effectiveness outputs rather than program inputs. An
alternative specified in terms of the variables of this
model can be described in terms of programs.
Figure 2 is a schematic of the model. The input-output
structure of the model is obvious. The boxes connecting
inputs to outputs are explained later. In the boxes the
methods by which inputs are transformed into outputs are
modeled. The transformation is linear in all cases
except for the cost output. To explain the time aspects of
the variables in the model it is helpful to distinguish
between stocks and flows. Stocks exist over many time
periods and are storeable, while flows have a per-time-
period nature. Basic resources constitute a flow over time,
Resources used in previous periods cannot be stored, so
more resources are required each period for production in
Hitch, Charles J., "Program Budgeting: An Appraisal,"
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The general structure of the model has been described
in the schematic. Let a box and the box's inputs and
outputs be called a submodel. Before the submodels can be
presented mathematically it is necessary to describe
activity analysis. Activity analysis is used in modeling
the transformation of inputs into outputs in the boxes of
the schematic.
As used in this model an activity is a single, linear,
fixed coefficient transformation of inputs into outputs.
Activity analysis as used in this paper is presented in
Lancaster, although a few changes are made in that material.
Assume that there is a set of all outputs and a set of all
inputs for each submodel. Then an activity is represented
by a column vector of length equal to the total number of
outputs and inputs in the two sets. For convenience the
top components of the vector correspond to the various
outputs and the lower components to the inputs. If an
activity produces certain outputs from certain inputs then
the vector will have positive numbers for the components
corresponding to these outputs and inputs and zeroes
elsewhere. The positive numbers are the amounts of each
output produced and each input used when the activity is
Lancaster, Kelvin, Mathematical Economics
, pp. 98-101,
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1968.
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operated at unit level. The unit level of an activity is
chosen arbitrarily and does not change once fixed. Select-
ing the level at which the activity is operated, the
activity level, chooses a positive scalar by which all
components of the vector are multiplied. The product of
the column vector and the scalar activity level is a new
column vector whose components are the quantities of outputs
produced and inputs used when the activity is operated at
the activity level.
For a given submodel there are many activities,
represented by vectors of the same length with different
nonzero elements in different places. These column vectors
can be placed side by side to form a matrix. The number of
rows equals the total number of outputs and inputs in the
submodel. The number of columns equals the number of
activities. This matrix is called the technology matrix.
The activity levels for the activities in the matrix can be
arranged in a column vector. The column vector is of
length equal to the number of activities. Its first ele-
ment is the level at which the first activity (first column
of the matrix) is operated. Its last element is the level
at which the last activity (last column of the matrix) is
operated. The product of the technology matrix and the
column vector of activity levels is another column vector
of length equal to the total number of outputs and inputs
in the submodel. Its elements are the total quantities of
each output produced and input used when all of the
21

activities in the matrix are operated at the specified
activity levels. When the activity levels are chosen the
quantities of outputs produced and inputs used in the sub-
model are known.
Equation Set 1 is an activity analysis model of the
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production theory in economics was concerned with substitu-
tability between primary inputs, activity analysis empha-
sizes complementary inputs and the joint production of
outputs. However, the existence of the same output in
alternative activies can allow substitution of the inputs
of the alternative activities.
Many real world transformations of inputs into outputs
can be modeled using activity analysis. Activity analysis
can be used to model the transformation of inputs into
outputs even when real world processes do not correspond
in a one-to-one manner with the activities. Individual
activities do not necessarily have to represent individual
real world processes. Activity analysis can be used when-
ever the real world relations between inputs and outputs,
no matter how the real world transformations are made, can
be satisfactorily represented by activity analysis. If
real world processes do correspond to activities, activity
analysis is all the more useful. Activity analysis can be
used in the same way that implicit functions are often used
in economics, as a tool to keep track of inputs and outputs,
It is only necessary that real world relationships between
inputs and outputs be consistent with the properties of
activity analysis. The most important properties of
activities in this respect are: the linearity of the
transformation of inputs into outputs, constant returns to




The mathematical structure of the submodels can now be
presented. Each submodel in each time period will have the
mathematical structure of Equation Set 1 in the preceding
section. The technology matrices for the submodels in a
time period model the transformations of inputs into outputs
which are expected to exist in that time period. The tech-
nology matrices represent the predictions which are made at
the beginning of the planning period when "the plan" is
chosen.
The first submodel in the schematic is the production
submodel, in which basic resources are used to produce new
elements. Assume that over the whole planning horizon the
total number of basic resources which can ever be used as
inputs to this submodel is k and the total number of new
elements which can ever be produced is J . Not every basic
resource may exist in every time period and it may not be
possible to produce all system elements in each time period.
However, K and J are the total numbers of resources and
elements, each of which can exist at some time within the
planning horizon. Denote the amount of the k basic
resource used in period t by x, , k = 1, ..., K and the
amount of the j n new element produced in period t by
y . » j = 1, ..., J . Assume that there are y activities
in period t . Also assume that each activity has as
24

output only one new element and that each element is
produced by only one activity. There is no limit set on
the number of resources which may be required to produce
one element. This is a restricted form of general activity
5
analysis called input-output analysis. Since one activity
t
produces one element the number of activities, Y , is
less than or equal to the number of elements, J . Unless
all J elements are produced in a single time period
Y < J The unit level of each activity is that level of
the activity which produces one unit of the new element.
The activity analysis production submodel in a single time
period is given by Equation Set 2. Here w , g - ±, ..., y ,
are the activity levels. The top part of the technology
matrix contains only ones and zeroes and need not be
arranged as an identity submatrix: the activities (columns)
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be used or an element cannot be produced because of
technology in a time period, then the corresponding row of
the technology matrix will contain only zeroes. Equation






The next submodel is the systems submodel, in which the
system elements available in a time period are grouped into
systems which have characteristics. Denote the quantity of
elements of type j, j = 1, ..., J, used as input to the
t
submodel in period t by L_ Since elements last
for the whole planning period L. is equal to the sum
of all the elements produced up to and in the time period
Assume that the total number
of system characteristics, each of which can exist at some
/ T t 1 2 , t N
time within the planning horizon, is I . Denote the
t . ..
amounts of system characteristics in period t by z^> *• = •-»
• • | i
.
Assume that each activity in the activity analysis model
of the systems submodel represents one system, one way of
grouping elements together. Then the activity analysis





























An activity, or system, may be a grouping of many
elements and may have many characteristics, so the







The third submodel is the benefit submodel, in which
system characteristics are transformed into measures of
effectiveness or benefits. Let the total number of bene-
fits, each of which can exist at some time in the planning
,
th
horizon, be L . Then denote the amount of l measure
t
of effectiveness or benefit in time period t by E^,
1 = 1, ..., L . Assume that each activity in the benefit
submodel transforms a single system characteristic into
many benefits, that one characteristic can be the input to
only one activity, and that the unit level of an activity
27

requires one unit of the system characteristic as input.
Assume that all characteristics are transformed into bene-
fits and that there are a activities in time period t
Then the number of activities, a , in a time period is
less than the number of characteristics, I , unless all
characteristics exist in the time period, in which case
a = I
. The activity analysis benefit submodel is given



























The lower part of the technology matrix need not be
arranged as an identity submatrix: the activities (columns)
can be arranged in any order. The top part of the tech-
nology matrix has no simple form since a single character-










In summary, the benefit side of the model, made up of
the production, systems, and benefit submodels, uses acti-
vity analysis for each time period. In activities resources
produce single elements, elements are grouped into systems
which have characteristics, and single characteristics
yield benefits. The benefit side of the model is linear.
The cost side of the model is not linear. The multiple
measures of cost are a function of the resources used in all
time periods (all x's), the elements produced in all time
periods (all y's), and the characteristics which exist in
all time periods (all z 's). Denote the m cost
measure by C , m = 1, ...,M. Then C = C (x n ,* m m m 1
..., x
, y , ..., y , z n , ..., z , t = 1, ..., T) . It is assumedK 1 J 1 I
that all cost measures are monotonically increasing
functions of the quantities of resources, elements, and
characteristics. If quantities of all resources, elements,
and characteristics in all time periods except Q , the
quantity of one resource, element, or characteristic in one
time period, are held constant, then C increases at an
m
increasing rate as Q increases. This is represented
graphically in Figure 3 . The assumption of increasing mar-






must be bid away from the economy. As goods and services
are purchased it becomes more costly to purchase more. The
assumption conflicts with the linear cost assumptions which
are made when cost estimating relations are formed by
regression in the real world. However, cost estimating
relations which are linear in the logs are consistent with
the assumption. Costs are not broken down by categories
such as research and development, investment, and operating.
However, the contributions of resources and elements to the
cost functions incorporate investment costs and the contri-
butions of characteristics incorporate operating costs.
30

VI. THE EFFICIENCY PROBLEM
It has been stated that the efficient frontier is
studied in this model. In this section a mathematical
program is formulated which has as its solution an
efficient alternative. By varying the parameters in the
objective function of the program all efficient alterna-
tives can be solutions.
Consider all of the submodels in all of the time periods
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The model has been constructed in such a way that these
relations are true. The relations will be constraints in
the mathematical program.
Recall the efficient frontier in the single benefit-
single cost choice problem. When the frontier has appro-
priate shape a point on the frontier can be characterized
as the point of tangency of the frontier and some straight
line. See Figure 4. Consider the general straight line
c = aE - bC • The slope of the line is b/a and its
E axis intercept is c . For any point on the effi-
ciency frontier, let b = $E - H'C be the line which is
tangent to the efficient frontier at the point. Then the
point on the frontier can be viewed as the alternative from
the feasible set which maximizes $E - ¥C . in terms of
Figure 4 this means choosing the point from the feasible set
which lies on the line of slope */$ which has the highest
E axis intercept. The intercept increases as the line
moves up and to the left. The point from the feasible set
which lies on the highest and farthest left line of slope
¥/$ is the point on the frontier. It is also true that
for any $, Y > the alternative from the feasible set
which maximizes $E - ¥C is efficient. The point from
C
Figure 4. Tangent to the Efficiency Frontier
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the feasible set which lies on the highest and farthest left
line of any slope between zero and infinity is on the effi-
cient frontier. By varying $ and y all efficient
alternatives can be characterized: the efficient frontier
can be "swept out."
This reasoning can be extended to higher dimensional
choice problems. For example, any efficient alternative in
a two benefit-single cost choice problem can be viewed as


















cient alternative is the point of tangency of a plane
P = <i> E + $_ E
?
- YC and the feasible set in three dimen-
sions.
When this reasoning is applied to the T • L + M
dimensional choice problem of the model any efficient alter-
native can be characterized as the alternative from the
feasible set which maximizes <3> E + ... + $ E +
x X L L
... + *.e. + ... + s^e? - Y.c.. - c. - *P„(L„ for some $ 's11 LL 11 MM
and fs. The alternative is the point of tangency of a
hyperplane H = * E + ... + <J>V + ... + *W + ... +
$
T
E - ?c. - ... - V,. and the feasible set in T • L + ML L 11 MM
dimensions. This maximum is, however, one possible vector
maximum of E. , 1 = 1, . .., L, t = 1, ...,T, C ,m = l, ...,M.
1 m
The vector maximum of a vector of variables is the maximum of
their weighted sum, where the weightings are arbitrary. If
the weightings used in the vector maximization are
I,, 1"1, ...,L. t«l T.-V , m = 1, ...,M, then the vector1 m
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maximum is the same as the above maximum. Therefore, any
efficient alternative is the solution to the mathematical
program entitled The Efficiency Problem, for some set of
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As in the single benefit-single cost case it is also
true that the optimal solution to the efficiency problem
when the weightings are any $'s and -y's ($, 4" > 0)is an effi-
cient alternative. By varying the $ 's and Y 's all
efficient alternatives become solutions to the efficiency
problem: the efficient frontier is "swept out." If the
decision-maker specifies the * 's and 4* 's, if he
specifies how he weighs benefits over time and costs, then
34

"the plan" is the optimal solution to the efficiency
problem.
Note that some of the original variables of the model
do not appear in the efficiency problem. The activity
t t tlevels, _n,c.,u),t = l, ...,T
,
are the choice variables
in the problem. The z's, y's, and x's do not appear in
the efficiency problem, but they are easily computed from
the activity levels by multiplying the technology matrices
by the activity levels.
The feasible set in the efficiency problem has "facets"
due to its activity analysis basis. For example, in the two
benefit-single cost case the feasible set may be represented
geometrically as in Figure 5. The four edges of the solid
feasible set represent four benefit and cost producing
activities; the three curved surfaces represent combinations
of activity uses. An efficient alternative can always be
described as the point of tangency of some hyperplane and
the feasible set because of the shape of the feasible set.
Everything in the constraints is linear except the cost
functions, whose shapes have been described. However, the




Three Dimensional Efficiency Frontier
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of the feasible set because many hyperplanes can have the
same point of tangency. As in the single benefit-single
cost choice problem where f/$ gives the slope of the
tangent line, the ratios of the $ 's and ¥ \s to each
other give the slopes of the hyperplane. Since only the
ratios are important the $ ' s and y ' s can be scaled
arbitrarily. This is another way of saying that any single
measure of effectiveness or cost can be chosen as numeraire.
When a numeraire is chosen the $ ' s and T ' s are divided
by the weighting of the numeraire measure of effectiveness
or cost. This does not affect the slopes of the hyperplane.
The only change of interest is that the weighting of the
numeraire becomes one.
The Lagrangian of the efficiency problem is:
t=l 1=1 1 1 m=l m m t=l 1=1 1 1 a=l l,a a
M (c) ot ft
t Mt
=1 m m m b=l l,b b b=l J,b b g=lr l,g g
•••• gSiPj.gV g^ipj+i,gwg» •••• g=ipj+K,gwg ' t - x » •• T))
T I ( Z )t , «% t B* t t.
- £- .E-X; ( E.bT .. n - J,s. , c )t=l 1=1 i a=l L+i,a a b=l i,b b
T J (L)t
, f t t t f i i
t=l j=l j vb=l I+J,b"b 1=1 g=l*j,g g
The Lagrangian may not be useful in computing a solution,
but the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are useful in characterizing
a solution to the efficiency problem.
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are necessary
conditions for a maximum of the Lagrangian. If
36

E-, 1=1, ..., , C, m = 1, ..., M, ft , a = 1, ..., a ,
c, , b = i , ..., e , & , g = i , ...,y , t = i, ...,t,
D g
maximize the Lagrangian, then the following relations, which
involve partial derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect
to the choice variables and the Lagrange multipliers, must
hold:
1) •[ - X<
E)t




) =0 1-1, .... L
t = 1 , • • • , l
2) -V - X
(C)
= C = fi (-Y - X (C) ) =0 m - 1 Mmm m m m m
3) .it^.S* - ,la<2)\' So n'*o1=1 1 l,a 1=1 i L+l,a a
n (left side of above inequality) =0 a = 1, ...» a
a
t = 1, ..., T
4) S^iA st k + ,M,(,)t-J k " A* ?">*.* , " S =m=l m 1=1 -t i,b i=l l i,b j=l j I+j ,b b
i





K . M ,(C) J 3
C
m t K 3
e
m t , T J *(L)i t < n




(0=0 u (left side of above inequality) =0 g = 1, ., Y
6) - E n + E n b n n = X. unrestricted in sign 1=1, ..., L
1 a=l l,a a 1 #. .. i tu — 1 , • • • j 1
7) - C + C (domain of m cost function at optimum) =
m m
"(C)
X unrestricted in sign m = 1, ..., M
m
a 1 t -t ft
1
t -t o(z)t
8) -E,b. n + , Ls. , c, = A; unrestricted in sign
a=l i,a a b=l i,b b l
1 "" 1 j o • • } J- L J.). • • ) J
\* t *t I l'
•b=i
sj,bS + A gliPj.g^g = ° A j"
j = 1, ..., J t = 1, ..., T
The number of variables, T (L + a + 6 + y) + T (L + I + J) + 2M,
; I Y i ~i n c(L)t . . . . .9)
-JtS, ,?, .Z I-, P. w = X. unrestricted in sign
equals the number of relations. The shape of the effi-
ciency problem's feasible set, linear except for the cost
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functions, and its linear objective function show that the
Lagrangian has the concavity-convexity properties which
make the Kuhn-Tucker conditions sufficient as well as
necessary. This means that any set of benefits, costs,
activity levels, and Lagrange multipliers which satisfy the
above relations is a solution to the efficiency problem
and defines an efficient alternative.
The Lagrange multipliers are weightings which distribute,
or impute, the value of the objective function to the
constraints. All of the constraints can be written in the
form: left hand side minus right hand side equals zero.
For example:
t
-t a t -t
1 a=l l,a a
The Lagrange multiplier for a constraint is approximately
the increase in the objective function which would be
possible if the zero for that constraint were to become a
one. Since each constraint is in terms of a single vari-
able, this is the same as the increase in the objective
function if one more unit of the constraint variable were
available. Therefore, the Lagrange multiplier for a
constraint is the marginal value to the objective function
of the constraint variable. The constraint variables are
E*s, C 's, z's, and L 's. The Lagrange multipliers are
marginal, or imputed, values of the E ' s, C 's, z's, and




The Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be interpreted using the
meanings of the Lagrange multipliers. Since the conditions
are necessary for an efficient alternative, the interpreted
conditions characterize any efficient alternative. Since
the conditions are sufficient, the interpreted conditions
can be viewed as decision rules which guarantee efficiency.
If the decision rules are true for an alternative, then the
alternative is efficient. Consider the third condition:
1=1 1 l,a i=l l L+i,a
The third condition says that for unit level of operation
of any activity a in the benefit submodel, a = 1, ..., a t
the weighted output of the activity (weighted by imputed
value) is less than or equal to the weighted input
(weighted by imputed value) . If output of an activity is
called product and its input is called cost (not necessarily
related to the costs in the objective function), then
weighted product of an activity is less than or equal to its
imputed cost. Recall that an activity in the benefit sub-
model converts a single system characteristic into measures
of effectiveness. Therefore, the weighted product of any
system characteristic is less than or equal to its imputed
cost. If the activity is operated at a positive level,
n > , then the weighted product of the activity equals
the imputed cost. This means that the weighted product of
any system characteristic which exists in a time period is
equal to its weighted cost. Take the ratio of the third
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conditions for any two activities, a and a , in the
same or different time periods, t and t , which are
operated at positive level:
.tx^ibh .Lr(z)t i bh.1=1 1 l,a i=l i L+i,a
liW'i bh .Lj;fz)t 2 b'i.1=1 1 l»a_ i=l l L+i,a
The ratio of weighted products in measures of effectiveness
of two system characteristics existing in the same or
different time periods equals the ratio of their imputed
costs.
Consider the fourth condition:
1=1 l i,b 3=1 2 I+J>b m=l m 1=1 ~t i,b
i
It says that the weighted product of any activity b, b = 1>
-
. . , 3, in the systems submodel at unit level of operation
is less than or equal to its imputed cost. Here the imputed
cost is composed of two factors: weighted inputs (first
term) and weighted contribution to the cost functions of
the objective function (second term). The second term is
positive because the X l s(s=-¥ 's) are negative. Recall that
m m
an activity in the systems submodel represents a system.
This means that the weighted product in system character-
istics of any possible system in any time period is less
than or equal to its imputed cost. If the activity is
operated at positive level, c > , and the system
exists in the time period, then the weighted product in
system characteristics of the system equals its imputed
cost. If two systems, b and b , exist in the same or
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different time periods, t
1
and t~ , the ratio of their
weighted products in system characteristics equals the
ratio of their imputed costs:
i=l i x,b
1
j=l j I+j ,b 1 m=l m i-l^t^ i,b 1
1x^2 s'2
„
.i$<l)t 2 s'2 h !t«) 136.
,t2
1=1 1 i,b j = l j I+J,b 2 m=l m 1=1—- i,b
9zConsider the fifth condition: i












It says that the weighted product of any activity g, g = 1,
, Y in the production submodel is less than or equal to
its imputed cost. Here both cost terms are contributions
to the cost functions of the objective function, again
A (r)positive because the As are negative. Note that
m
the activity's output is weighted by the present and all
future Lagrange multipliers for elements. This reflects
the assumption that elements, once produced, last and con-
tribute to the objective function for the duration of the
planning period.
This means that the product of an activity in an early
time period is weighted more heavily than the product of an
activity in a later time period, since the earlier weighting
is the sum of the later weighting and all intervening
Lagrange multipliers for elements.
Recall that an activity in the production submodel has
a single element as output. Therefore, the value of any
possible element, weighted in its present and future time
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periods, is less an or equal to its imputed cost. If the
activity is operated at positive level, u > , and the
element is actually produced, its worth in present and
future time periods is equal to its imputed cost. If two
elements, g-^ and g 2 , are actually produced in the same
or different time periods, t. and t» , then the ratio of
their total weighted values is equal to the ratio of their
imputed costs:
T J
~(L)i ti M ?(Q J
3C





j=l j rj,g1 = m=l m J=lg-t 1 *3 t g1 k=1 3
" tl J™,^
J - Js




.1 ,£,A. p. z - Z.A f E ——- p.^ +,2, p T11 )i=t
2
j=l j rj,g 2 m=l m j=l ~t 2





It has been stated that, if the decision-maker specifies
the $ 's and V 's of the objective function of the
efficiency problem, then the optimal solution of the effi-
ciency problem is "the plan." The $ 's and * 's reflect
the way in which the decision-maker trades off benefits over
time and costs. When the $ 's and * 's are specified
the objective function of the efficiency problem can be
viewed as the present value to the decision-maker of
benefits and costs over the planning horizon. "The plan"
is chosen at the beginning of the planning period so that
the present value of the benefits and costs consumed over
the planning horizon is maximized. The concept of present
value of future consumption involves discounting. As is
usual in economics discounting reflects the preferences of
the decision-maker over time.
The objective function is:
T L t t M
t=l 1=1 1 1 m=l m m
Since the benefits have a time attribute the decision-
maker's discounting of benefits can be studied convention-
ally. The decision-maker's preferences over time for
benefits are reflected in the $ 's. Consider the weight-
ings of a single benefit over time, *,, t = 1, ..., T









iSi (1 + V
Then d. can be called the decision-maker's "marginal
rate of psychological discount" for the 1 "*-" benefit in
time period i . It is also possible to view (1 + d^) as
fi tthe "marginal discount factor." Note that $, , t = 1,
..., T could be divided by $ and the meaning of d.
would remain unchanged. For discounting purposes $, acts
as numeraire.
4-Vk f-
The change in 1 benefit in period t t ae ,
which just compensates the decision-maker for a unit loss
in the 1 th benefit in period one is:
AE^ = ,n- (1 + d.)
1 i=l i
If the dec is ion-maker always prefers benefit in an early
time period to the same benefit in later time periods, he
has positive time preferences in all time periods for that
benefit. This means that d. > for i = 1, ..., T for that
benefit. If he always prefers benefit in a late time
period to the same benefit in early time periods, he has
negative time preferences in all time periods for that
benefit. This means that d. < , i = 1, ..., T, for
that benefit.
Kuenne, Robert E. , The Theory of General Economic
Equilibrium, p. 231, Princeton University Press, 1963.
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The decision-maker can discount benefits in any way
that he wishes. It is often assumed in economics that
consumers have positive time preferences for commodities
because in consuming they forego investment which offers a
positive rate of return. In this model, however, the
decision-maker may have negative time preference. He may
prefer to have benefits later rather than sooner. In
economics rates of psychological discount are sometimes
assumed to be constant over time. There appears to be no
basis for such an assumption in this model. >
A decision-maker can have neutral time preferences for
th
the 1 benefit in all time periods. This means that
, th
d. = 0, i 1, ..., T for the 1 benefit and that12 T
$ = $"" = ... = $ . Neutral time preferences for all
benefits will result in greater total production of benefits
in all time periods than will occur if any time preferences
are positive or negative. Adding up benefits over time
periods assumes that the time periods are weighted equally.
If the decision-maker has neutral time preferences, then
individual benefits are weighted equally in all time
periods in the objective function. When the objective
function is maximized the sum of each benefit over time is
maximized. If a decision-maker has positive time prefer-
ences, he accepts less total benefits in all time periods
so that he can consume more benefits earlier.
Note that even with neutral time preferences for all
measures of effectiveness, more elements will be produced
45

in the production submodel in early time periods than in
later periods. This is because elements produced early are
grouped into systems whose characteristics yield benefits
,
measures of effectiveness, over the whole remaining planning
horizon. This is reflected in the weighting of elements by
the sum of their Lagrange multipliers for the remaining
planning period. Measures of effectiveness in different
time periods are balanced by producing elements early, so
that the elements yield balanced measures of effectiveness




In this section the effect of changes in the parameters
of the efficiency problem on the optimal solution to that
problem is studied. This study can be called sensitivity
analysis or comparative statics. The comparative statics
label emphasizes that the analysis is static. The optimal
solution to two mathematical programs, the original effi-
ciency problem and a new efficiency problem in which one or
more of the parameters of the original have been changed,
are compared. Nothing is said about the dynamics of the
change from one optimal solution to another.
The efficiency problem is a nonlinear programming
problem. The nonlinear ity is due to the cost functions.
The study of the effect of variations in parameters, or
sensitivity analysis, of the model cannot depend on simple
theorems about parameter variations, as would be the case
if the problem were linear. However, the fact that an
optimal solution to the efficiency problem is a saddle
point of the Lagrangian can be used as a basis for sensi-
tivity analysis of the model.
Let L (x, X_) be the original Lagrangian of the effi-
ciency problem, where x = E , C , n , t, , w , 1 = 1, ... $ L,
t t t
m = l, . . . , M, a=l, ..., a , b = l, ..., 3 , g = 1, •>.., Y , t = 1,
« 9 . 1 cinu A == A., « A « A , • A . « l B li •••lit
— 1 m l j
m= 1, ..., M, i = 1, ..., I, j = 1, ..., J, t = 1, ..., T.
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Let L' (x, X) be the Lagrangian of the efficiency
problem in which a parameter has been changed. Let x, X
be an optimal solution to the original efficiency problem
and let x» A he an optimal solution to the efficiency
problem with a parameter change. Then l (x, X) and
L 1 (x, X) are saddle points of L and L' , respectively.
The definition of a saddle point gives:
L (x, X) = L (x, V) = L(x, X)
V (£, X) = L' (x, X) = L' (x, X) 7
These inequalities imply:
L' (x, X ) - L (x, X) = L' (x, I) - L (x, X)
Recall that any parameter in either Lagrangian is multiplied
by at most a single variable and a single Lagrange multi-
plier. Any parameters which do not change are eliminated
in the above inequality by the subtraction of one Lagrangian
from the other, because the Lagrangians have the same
variables and Lagrange multipliers in their domains. This
means that if a single parameter changes:
Aparameter (x, A - x, A) =
where x, X and x, A are multiplied by the changing
parameter in L and l' , respectively. When two para-
meters of the efficiency problem are changed:
Aparameter (x , L - X-, X ) + Aparameter (x , X - x , X ) =
where x ' s, X ' s and x ' s, X ' s are multiplied by
the first and second changing parameters, respectively.
7 Hadley, G. , Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming, p. 75,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. , 1964.
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These inequalities can be used to evaluate the effect
of a change in one or two parameters of the efficiency-
problem. It will be seen that the effect is precisely-
specified by the inequalities when the changing parameter
is multiplied only by a variable and not by a Lagrange
multiplier in the Lagrangian.
Changes in the weightings of benefits, the $ 's, are
first considered. Then changes in the weightings of the
cost measures, the y 's, are studied. Finally changes
in components of the submodel technology matrices are
treated.
The effects of changes in the $ 's and * 's are of
special interest because it is changes in these parameters
which "sweep out" the efficient frontier. Consider an
increase in one of the $ 's. Let *n be increased by
A«J> to * ' . Since ®^ and Q^ are multi-
plied only by a variable, E. , in L and L' ,
respectively:
This means that increasing the weighting of a benefit in
the objective function of the efficiency problem can only
increase or leave unchanged the optimal amount of the
benefit produced. Consider an increase in two * 's, $-^-
and $^ 2 . The inequality is:
A*' 1 (E^ 1 - Eh) + A^ 2 (5*2 - fi*2) >
ll l x U 12 12 J-2
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This relation allows no statement about the direction of
change of the individual optimal benefits. Rather it allows
complicated statements about how the optimal benefits vary-
together. For example, the inequality is equivalent to:
1± < 12 1 2






This version of the inequality has no simple interpretation.
Similar conclusions follow from changing two $ 's in any
way, not just increasing them.
The effect of a change in a ¥ is evaluated in the same
way as is the effect of a change in a $ Increasing a Y
parameter makes the -¥ weighting of a cost measure more
negative. Since the -¥ weightings are negative, the direc-
tion of movement of the cost measure which is weighted by a
-y is opposite to the direction of change in the parameter.
Increasing the parameter, making the weighting of one cost
measure in the objective function of the efficiency problem
more negative, decreases or leaves unchanged the optimal
amount of that cost measure. This result is intuitively
appealing. The weightings of the cost measures are negative
because the decision-maker prefers less cost. If he has
higher preference for less of a particular cost measure, if
the weighting of the cost measure is more negative, then it
is optimal to have less or the same amount of that cost
measure. When two ¥ 's are changed no statement about the
direction of change of the individual cost measures is possi-
ble. When one Y and one $ are changed no statement about




Study of the effect of changes in components of the
technology matrices is important because these matrices are
predictions about the future, made at the beginning of the
planning period. It is of interest to know how the optimal
solution to the efficiency problem is affected by an error
in the predictions. However, the effect of a change in a
component of one of the technology matrices is difficult to
evaluate using the saddle point results. The components of
the technology matrices are the parameters of the con-
straints. With two exceptions the components of the tech-
nology matrices are multiplied both by variables and by
Lagrange multipliers. The effect of a change in a component
of all but two types of technology matrices cannot be broken
down into an effect on the variable or on the Lagrange
multiplier. Only the effect on both together can be
described.
Consider an increase in a component of the lower (input)
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This is equivalent to:
If the j " element contributes positive value to the
















xjL)t ) , tl
activity was operated at a positive level before the
parameter change was made, z,, > . When these things
D
are true:
increases with the parameter
, then the activity level must
by a greater percentage. If the
reases with the parameter change
hen the activity level decreases by a
smaller percentage or increases. Similar statements can be
made about the effect of changing a component of the lower
(input) part of a benefit technology matrix.
There is an added difficulty in analyzing the effect of
a change in a component of a technology matrix which appears
in the cost functions. The upper (output) parts of the
production and systems technology matrices and the lower
(input) parts of the production technology matrices appear
in the domains of the cost functions. The change in the
nonlinear cost functions caused by a change in a component
of one of these technology matrices must be approximated by
replacing the nonlinear C 's with linear approximations,
C * 's. The change in the C 's caused by a component
change in one of the above-mentioned technology matrices is




Study of the effect of a change in a component of the
lower (input) part of a production technology matrix illus-
trates the use of linear approximations to the cost
functions. If p T11 is increased by AP To.i, n '
L
1





(x, X) - L (x, X) = Jf®\* <APjWg>
1
1 t
L and L are identical for a change in pj+k g /
except in the cost functions. Subtracting L from L
leaves only the change in the cost function, which is
approximated by treating the cost functions as linear.
Using the approximation the inequality is:
?,x
(C)
c*(p' =') 2 lx (c) c *( p' S«)
m=l m m J+k,g g m=l m m J+k,g g










X = X =-4/ for all nonzero cost functions. Again
m m m J
using the approximation the inequality becomes:
M t -t t ~tu >
-IJC (Ap T ,, w - Ap_,. a) ) =m=l m m FJ+k,g g J+k,g g
Since the
-v 's are negative, the optimal activity level
must either decrease or remain unchanged when a component
of the lower (input) part of the production technology
matrix is increased.
Study of the effect of a change in a component of the
upper (output) part of a production or systems technology
matrix is very difficult. Not only must the cost functions
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be approximated as linear functions, but Lagrange multi-
pliers limit the statements about effects which can be made
from the inequalities.
A change in a component in the upper (output) part of a
benefit technology matrix, Ab
n
, remains to be con-i,a
sidered. The inequality is:
r(E)t A,t -t > T (E)t.,t ~tX.v Ab.. n = X.N Ab.. n
1 l,a a 1 l,aa
The first Kuhn-Tucker condition says that optimal
X**'* = $* if optimal E^ > . Therefore, if the
benefit is produced:
*,Ab, (n - n ) =
1 l.a a a
Since all $ ' s are positive the optimal activity level
must increase or remain unchanged when a component in the
upper (output) part of a benefit technology matrix is
increased.
In this section the inequalities have been interpreted
assuming increases in the changing parameters. The in-
equalities can also be interpreted assuming decreases in the
changing parameters. The interpretations are the same,




The model represents the choice problem embedded in a
PPB system. The efficiency problem includes all the informa-
tion which is needed to calculate efficient alternatives.
Nothing has been assumed, however, about where in the
Department of Defense this information is known. It seems
obvious that no centralized level of the Department of
Defense has all this information. It has only been assumed
that some real world procedure exists, such as the tatonne-
ment process described in the Introduction, which allows
decisions to be made as if all the information were known at
a centralized level. The efficiency problem is therefore
formulated as if all the information is known at a central-
ized level. It is of interest to see if the efficiency
problem can be decomposed into a set of smaller problems.
If a set of smaller problems which is equivalent to the
efficiency problem can be found, then real world planning
procedures need only solve the set of smaller problems.
Intuitively this would be more efficient. Decomposing the
efficiency problem into smaller subproblems is called
decentralization.
One type of decentralization which bears close relation
to the real world is decentralization by services. This
would mean that the efficiency problem for the whole
Department of Defense would be broken down into a set of
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efficiency problems, one for each service. The monotoni-
cally increasing nature of the cost functions for the
Department of Defense makes this type of decentralization
difficult. Since the scale of operation of the whole
Department of Defense determines costs, the cost functions
of each service depend on the scale of operation of the
other services. In order to decentralize by services
planning procedures which handle this problem of externality
of costs would have to be formulated.
Another type of decentralization is by submodel. The
efficiency problem would be broken down into smaller, sub-
model problems. The submodel decision-maker's problem could
be to select activity levels after he has received informa-
tion from above and below. Suppose that the decision-maker
receives imputed values or shadow prices for the inputs and
outputs of his submodel. Suppose that the shadow prices are
the optimal Lagrange multipliers from the original (now
called consolidated) efficiency problem. Then any activity
in the submodel which was operated at a positive level in
the optimal solution to the consolidated problem will give
zero profit when outputs and inputs are priced at their
shadow prices. Any activity not used at a positive level
in the consolidated problem will give zero or negative
profit. This is due to the third, fourth, and fifth Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. Assume that the submodel decision-
maker's objective is to maximize profit when outputs and
inputs of the submodel are priced at their shadow prices.
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Then he will choose to operate at a positive level only-
activities which give zero profit because all other activi-
ties give negative profit. These activities include, but
may not be restricted to, activities which were operated at
a positive level in the consolidated problem. Since all
activities give zero profit at any activity level he will
set activity levels arbitrarily. There is no guarantee that
he will choose the activity levels which were optimal in
the consolidated problem. Thus the model cannot be
decentralized by shadow prices alone.
Suppose that the decision-maker receives shadow prices
for the submodel outputs from above, but from below he
receives a vector of inputs which he must use to produce
outputs. Suppose that his objective is to operate the
activities at levels which use all the inputs and give maxi-
mum profits (no longer zero) when outputs are priced at
their consolidated shadow prices. For a given time period
let T be the upper (output) part of the submodel
technology matrix, T the lower (input) part of the
matrix, X_' the column vector of shadow prices of the
outputs from the consolidated problem optimal solution,
0^ the row vector of activity levels, and c.' the column
vector of inputs. Then the decision-maker's problem in the
time period is:
Max Vl^Q subject to T (I) = c. 1 1
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In the consolidated model the outputs of one submodel
are the inputs to the next submodel. To specify the input
vector of a submodel the outputs of the preceding submodel
must be known. Therefore, this type of horizontal
decentralization must be sequential. First profit in the
production submodel must be maximized in each time period
in the planning period using the element shadow prices and
amounts of inputs which were optimal in the consolidated
problem. Then profit in the systems submodels must be
maximized in each time period using the consolidated
characteristic shadow prices and the total amounts of ele-
ments produced in the production submodel in previous
periods. Finally profit in the benefit submodel must be
maximized using the consolidated program's shadow prices
for measures of effectiveness and the amounts of character-
istics produced in the systems submodel.
It has not been possible to prove that this sequential,
horizontal decentralization gives the same solution to the
efficiency problem as did the consolidated program. Investi-
gation of special cases indicates that if shadow prices for
outputs and the vector of inputs from the consolidated
program are used, the optimal activity levels of the con-
solidated program will be optimal solutions to the submodel
programs. However, the consolidated optimum is not a
unique solution to the submodel program in special cases
(e.g. when two or more activities operated at a positive




If activity levels other than the consolidated optimal
levels are used in any submodel below the benefit submodel,
then the input vectors to higher submodels will differ from
the consolidated optimum and the decentralized solution will
not match the consolidated. This method of decentralization
requires that the resource input vector to the production
submodel from the consolidated program be known.
Consider the validity of this sequential, horizontal
decentralization as a conjecture. If the model can be
decentralized in this way, then each submodel can be further
decentralized. Assume that the technology matrix of a sub-
model in a time period describes the transformation of
inputs into outputs in several different institutions. For
example, assume that the Army and Navy can use inputs to
produce outputs in the same ways: they have identical
technology matrices. Let input vectors, c. and c^ , be
given to the Army and Navy, respectively, where c.
+ c„ = c and c is the vector of amounts of inputs
—N —c —
c
optimally used in the consolidated program. Let the Army
and Navy trade inputs at their optimal consolidated shadow
prices,
_X . Let the input vectors after trading be c*
A
and c * . Assume that the Army and Navy maximize profits
—
N
when outputs are priced at their shadow prices, using the
after-trading vectors of inputs. The Army and Navy will
choose activity levels and o , respectively, to
i\ IN
solve the following linear programs:
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—A —A —A —
Max X'T
(O)
M subject to T
(I)




—N —N —N —
Lancaster proves some statements which show that the sum of
the activity level solutions to these linear programs is the
same as the solution,
,




program. The centralized submodel program is:
Max A'T
(O)





—c —c —c —
This means that the decentralized submodel operates in the
same way as the centralized submodel..
If the efficiency problem is decentralized sequentially
and horizontally and then again by services, the resulting
set of smaller problems appear to be easy to solve in the
real world. It is only required that the services in the
submodels know their own technology matrices.
o
Lancaster, Kelvin, Mathematical Economics , pp. 110-111,




In this paper a model of the PPB problem has been
formulated in which the variables are resources, elements,
characteristics, benefits, and costs. An efficiency
problem has been developed for the model. The efficiency
problem has as its optimal solution an efficient PPB alter-
native. When all possible values of the parameters of the
objective function of the efficiency problem are considered
the optimal solutions constitute the PPB efficient frontier,
"The plan" is one alternative on the efficient frontier,
selected on the basis of the decision-maker's preferences.
Decision rules which are necessary and sufficient for an
efficient alternative have been derived. The discounting
of benefits over time which is involved in choosing an
alternative from the efficient frontier has been discussed.
The effects of changes in the parameters of the model have





Malinvaud, Edmond, and Bacharach, M. O. L. , eds.,
"Decentralized Procedures for Planning" by Edmond
Malinvaud, Activity Analysis in the Theory of Growth
and Planning; Proceedings of a Conference held by the
International Economic Association, pp. 170-208, St.
Martin's Press, 1967.
Hitch, Charles J. , and McKean, Roland N. , The Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age, Harvard University Press,
1963.
Hitch, Charles J., "Program Budgeting: An Appraisal,"
Tax Review , Vol. XXIX, No. 7, July, 1968.
Lancaster, Kelvin, Mathematical Economics , The Macmillan
Company, New York, 1968.
Kuenne, Robert E. , The Theory of General Economic
Equilibrium , Princeton University Press, 1963.
Hadley, G. , Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming , Addison-





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Assoc. Professor C. R. Jones, Code 55 Js 1
Department of Operations Analysis
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. LTjg. Robert Stephen Brent, SC, USN 1
545 E Street
Chula Vista, California 92010
5. Naval Postgraduate School 1








DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA -R&D
[Security clas sitication ot titto. body ot abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report Is classified)
1 originating ACTIVITY f Corpora te author)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940




A Model of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Problem
4 DESCRIPTIVE NO TE s (Type ot report andjnclus i ve dates)
Master s Thesis; June 1970
5. authohiSi ffirsi name, middle initial, laat name)
Robert Stephen Brent
6 REPOR T D A TE
June 197
8a. CONTRACT OR GRAN I NO.
6. PROJEC T NO.
7». TOTAL NO. OF PAGES
66
76. NO. OF REFS
9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
96. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned
this report)
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
This document has been approved for public release and sale;
its distribution is unlimited.
II. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 12. SPONSORING MILI TAR Y ACTIVITY
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
13. ABSTR AC T
A model of the planning, programming, and budgeting problem is
formulated. The variables of the model are resources, elements,
characteristics, benefits (measures of effectiveness), and costs.
The nature of the PPB problem requires that the model incorporate
multiple measures of benefit and cost. To characterize efficient
choices in the PPB context decision rules which are necessary and
sufficient for efficiency are derived. Discounting of benefits over
time is discussed. Sensitivity analysis of the model is performed.
Decentralization possibilities in the model are explored.
DD FORMi nov es
S/N 0101 -807-661 1
1473 (PAGE 1 ) Unclassified











),?oR:, 91473 (BACK) UNCLASSIFIED







A model of the e
planning, prog ramming,amminK
and budgeting prob- roblem
lem.
| 6 APR'7*












A model of the planning, programming, an
3 2768 001 01639 7
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
